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PREFACE 
“The field of evidence is no other than the field of knowledge” (Jeremy Bentham) 
 
“Have you ever given any attention to the Science of Evidence?” said Mr Grodman. 
“How do you mean?”, asked the Home Secretary, rather puzzled, but with a melancholy smile. “I should 
hardly speak of it as a science. I look at it as common sense”. 
“Pardon me, sir. It is the most difficult of all the sciences. It is indeed rather the science of sciences. What 
is the whole of inductive logic, as laid down (say) by Bacon and Mill, but an attempt to appraise the value 
of evidence, the said evidence being in the trails left by the Creator, so to speak? The Creator has (I say it 
in all reverence) drawn a myriad of red herrings across the track. But the true scientist refuses to be 
baffled by superficial appearances in detecting the secrets of Nature.” (Israel Zangwill) 
 
All human beings draw inferences from evidence every day of their 
lives. We hear about evidence and inference on television, in the press 
and on Facebook. In the public sphere evidence is an indispensable 
element of restricting nuclear proliferation, investigating genocide, in 
military intelligence, medical diagjnosis, in the administration of justice, 
and in decisions by politicians, judges, engineers and many others. 
Evidence-based medicine and evidence-based policy are now 
fashionable in many countries. And, of course, evidence is at the centre 
of nearly all scientific and humanistic disciplines. 
At an abstract level there is an immense theoretical literature about 
evidence __ for example, in epistemology, ontology, logic, 
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mathematics, and  statistics. In theology, proof of the existence of God 
has been a contested issue through the ages. Yet there has been much 
less work at more concrete levels on drawing out what is common and 
what is special about practical inferential reasoning in different 
contexts and enquiries. A major exception to this has been the work of 
David Schum who for most of his long career has been studying the 
properties, uses, discovery and marshaling of evidence in probabilistic 
reasoning in a wide range of contexts and disciplines. Evidential 
Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning (hereafter Foundations) was first 
published in 1994. It is Schum’s magnum opus, but it was preceded and 
succeeded by many other publications. The purpose of this Preface is to 
set this classic work in a wider context and to draw attention to some 
of Schum’s important work since 1994. 
David Schum was born in Chicago in 1930. He obtained the BA and MA 
degrees biology and psychology from Southern Methodist University 
and a PhD degree  (1964) from Ohio State University. His early work 
was mainly in Psychology and Statistics, but over time he transcended 
many disciplines both in theory and practice. His present post is 
Professor of Systems Engineering and Law at George Mason University, 
but he has also been associated with a Medical Faculty, several law 
schools, and, as Honorary Professor of Evidence Science, at University 
College London. He has long been involved in training intelligence 
analysts for the American security services. An early work, Evidence and 
Inference for the Intelligence Analyst (1987), is a model of clarity. 
Although intended as a simple introduction, it was published in two 
large volumes which unnecessarily made it appear formidable and 
inaccessible. It sank almost without trace. It is still worth consulting. In 
addition to his extraordinary breadth of knowledge across disciplines 
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Schum is also renowned for his concern for the practical application of 
his ideas in many different contexts. 
Quite early in his enquiries David Schum came across a copy of the 
1937 of John Henry Wigmore’s Science of Judicial Proof: As Given in 
Logic, Psychology and General Experience Significantly, the first two 
editions had been called Principles of Judicial Proof and the substitution 
of Science for Principles was made on the insistence of the publisher. 
Wigmore is the most famous scholar of the Law of Evidence in the 
history of the Common Law, but his Principles of Proof, addressed to 
practising attorneys, was not taken seriously and was largely ignored. 
Wigmore’s aim was to advance a systematic way of constructing 
arguments based on masses of evidence in complex legal cases. Schum 
immediately recognized not only that Wigmore’s enterprise was very 
similar to his own but that he was in some important respects a kindred 
spirit. For example, the passage from Zangwill quoted above was a 
favourite of both of them and caught the essence of their shared 
concerns. Schum also realized that Wigmore was years ahead of his 
time. Shortly after the publication of Foundations, Schum co-authored 
with Joseph Kadane, a Professor of Statistics at Carnegie Mellon 
University, a book-length study of the evidence in one American cause 
célèbre, the Sacco-Vanzetti case, inter alia applying and refining 
Wigmore’s ‘chart method’.  
Wigmore became one of Schum’s main sources of inspiration. Schum 
built on him, clarified his terminology and brought his own breadth of 
knowledge beyond law to bear on Wigmore’s approach, linking it to 
both psychology and probability theory. As it happened, Schum’s 
discovery of Wigmore roughly coincided with a revival of interest in 
theoretical aspects of evidence in legal contexts both in the United 
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States and Britain. Stimulated largely by the misuse of statistics in the 
California case of People v Collins (1968) a lively debate developed in 
North America about the use of probabilities in judicial decision-
making. Most of this debate centered round different theories of 
mathematical probability. However, Jonathan Cohen, an English 
philosopher interested in inductive logic, argued that for fact-finding in 
legal contexts the proper model was not mathematical (‘Pascalian’) 
reasoning about probabilities but rather non-mathematical inductivist 
(‘Baconian’) reasoning. Cohen’s work produced a storm of controversy 
in both legal and psychological circles. The debate still continues. 
Interestingly English jurists tend to favour the Baconian approach, 
whereas in America the debate has been mainly between Bayesians, 
frequentists and other ‘Pascalians’. Schum manages to accommodate 
both approaches.  
In the early 1970s a third stream of revived interest developed. Around 
1970 I took up evidence as a special interest, partly influenced by 
Jeremy Bentham (who had argued that all formal legal rules of evidence 
should be abolished) and partly by the American Realist, Jerome Frank, 
who emphasized the importance of fact-finding in adjudication and 
legal practice. Like Schum, I soon discovered Wigmore’s Principles and 
decided that his ‘chart method’ could be modified as a useful heuristic 
for training law students how to construct and criticize arguments on 
questions of fact. Quite independently, Terence Anderson of the 
University of Miami Law School started to use Wigmorean analysis in 
his courses on evidence. Schum, Anderson and I first developed our 
ideas in this area sepratel from each other until the early 1980s. In 1981 
I joined forces with Anderson and I first came across two articles by 
Schum about the same time. Eventually all three of us got together and 
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started a professional relationship and friendship which has lasted ever 
since. Often the late Peter Tillers was a fourth member of the group. He 
and Schum collaborated on an important empirical study of fact-
investigation, which clearly showed the wide application of Wigmorean 
analysis beyond adjudication. Anderson and I collaborated on a book 
designed primarily for law students on Analysis of Evidence (first 
published edition 1991). This was based in part on a modified 
Wigmorean approach. Later we invited Dave to become a co-author for 
the second edition, which was published in 2005.  
In 1994 Anderson and I were invited to the Netherlands Institute of 
Advanced Study (NIAS) to join an interdisciplinary team that was 
studying ‘forensic expertise’ in the Netherlands Criminal Justice System.  
In addition to our main project we formed a multi-disciplinary group of 
social scientists, historians and other humanists and threw down the 
following challenge: 
“Notwithstanding differences in (i) the objectives of our particular 
enquiries; (ii) the nature and extent of the available source material; 
(iii) the culture of our respective disciplines (including its history, 
conventions, state of development etc.); (iv) national backgrounds; (v) 
other contextual factors, all of our projects involve, as part of the 
enterprise, drawing inferences from evidence to test hypotheses and 
justify conclusions and that the logic of this kind of enquiry is governed 
by the same principles.” 
After a number of seminars and other events we invited David Schum 
to join us and to write the introductory chapter in the volume we were 
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planning. Entitled “Evidence and Inference about Past Events: an 
Overview of Six Case Studies”, this paper extended Schum’s  range to 
Theatre Iconography, Assyriology, Musicology, Economic History, 
History of Political Thought, and the use of love letters as crucial 
evidence in a murder trial. He navigated these different essays with 
aplomb and presented an early version of his ‘substance-blind 
approach’ to the science of evidence which he further developed in a 
major multi-disciplinary programme at University College London (UCL) 
(2004-08). This culminated in an edited volume, Evidence, Inference and 
Enquiry, published by the British Academy in 2011. David Schum’s 
Foundations was the starting-point of this ambitious programme, he 
was a leading participant and he contributed a chapter on ‘Classifying 
Forms and Combinations of Evidence: Necessary in a Science of 
Evidence”. In the abstract to his paper he provided a brief summary of 
his approach ‘to an integrated science of evidence’ as it stood in 2010, 
sixteen  years after Foundations as follows: 
“[E]vidence forms the foundation for inferential reasoning in any 
conceivable discipline, and there are three important credentials of all 
evidence: relevance, credibility and inferential (or probative) weight or 
force. The evidence classification scheme I developed I have referred to 
as being substance-blind, meaning that the classes of individual items of 
evidence I identify are recurrent and apply regardless of the substance 
or content of the evidence. There are also substance-blind 
combinations of evidence that are also recurrent.” 
At UCL Schum met some resistance to his general approach: some who 
were in general revolt against ‘scientism’ in their own fields, objected 
to the use of the term ‘science’ in this context; but Schum made it clear 
that he too was against exaggerated claims of ‘scientism’ (citing Haack 
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2007), but he was using ‘science’ in a relatively soft sense, that 
emphasizes classification. Personally I think that Wigmorean analysis is 
more art than science. Some others were resistant on the grounds that 
the very idea of ‘evidence’ is context-specific and in their own 
discipline(s) there are special types of data and modes of interpretation 
that are discipline-specific. In my view, none of them negated the 
generality of Schum’s key concepts, but in some cases they may have 
raised some interesting questions about the idea of substance-
blindness. Other objections seemed to rest on rather strong versions of 
the autonomy of disciplines. I think that Schum’s ‘substance-blind’ 
approach survives these criticisms and that his later work has 
confirmed and only slightly refined the views he advanced in 
Foundations. He gives due regard to the particularities of context, and 
even to intellectual traditions and the culture of disciplines, but 
nevertheless he has presented some conceptual and other tools of very 
wide application. The greatest strength is that he shows how different 
disciplines can learn from each other. Certainly, Law has a lot to offer 
other disciplines in respect of concepts, methods and techniques for 
constructing arguments, but we can learn even more from our sister 
disciplines.  
One disappointment to date has been that these projects have not 
attracted the attention of many scholars from the ‘hard’ sciences, who 
sometimes seem to think that ‘evidence’ is not problematic for them. 
Some medics participated in the UCL programme and Anderson and I 
have invaded the spheres of archeology and international criminal 
tribunals. Forensic science has recently received Wigmorean attention 
from Paul Roberts and others. But chemists, biologists and physics have 
stayed away. I would welcome the application of Schum’s approach to 
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astronomy and forensic anthropology, for example. But so far the main 
attention has been on Law, and some of the Humanities and Social 
Sciences.   
David Schum is a dedicated teacher who has earned the gratitude of 
many students across several disciplines. He is known for his 
enthusiasm, his clarity, his accessibility, and for the fact that he has 
taught many of them some useful skills of wide application. To end on a 
personal note: Anderson, Schum and I have visited each other’s 
courses, stayed in each other’s homes, and debated in private and 
public for over 30 years. Dave is one of my closest friends. He is warm, 
generous and good company. He is not always the best guardian of his 
own interests. For instance, he was not even aware for some months 
that Foundations had appeared in paperback. Over the years I have 
tried to persuade him that if he wishes to sell the film rights of 
Foundations to Hollywood he will have to allow them to change the 
title to Proof. That would be a good name for a movie. 
William Twining 
Quain professor of Jurisprudence, University College London 
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